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Abstract
Hardcore functions have been used as a technical tool to construct secure cryptographic systems; how-
ever, little is known on their quantum counterpart, called quantum hardcore functions. With a new insight
into fundamental properties of quantum hardcores, we present three new quantum hardcore functions
for any (strong) quantum one-way function. We also give a “quantum” solution to Damg˚ard’s question
(CRYPTO’88) on a classical hardcore property of his pseudorandom generator, by proving its quantum
hardcore property. Our major technical tool is the new notion of quantum list-decoding of “classical”
error-correcting codes (rather than “quantum” error-correcting codes), which is defined on the platform
of computational complexity theory and computational cryptography (rather than information theory).
In particular, we give a simple but powerful criterion that makes a polynomial-time computable classical
block code (seen as a function) a quantum hardcore for all quantum one-way functions. On their own
interest, we construct efficient quantum list-decoding algorithms for classical block codes whose associated
quantum states (called codeword states) form a nearly phase-orthogonal basis.
Keywords: quantum hardcore, quantum one-way, quantum list-decoding, codeword state, phase orthog-
onal, presence, Johnson bound
AMS Subject Classifications: 14G50, 81P68, 94A60
1 From Hardcores to List Decoding
Modern cryptography heavily relies on computational hardness and pseudorandomness. One of its key notions
is a hardcore bit for a one-way function—a bit that could be determined from all the information available
to the mighty adversary but still looks random to any “feasible” adversary. A hardcore function transforms
the onewayness into pseudorandomness by generating such hardcore bits of a given one-way function. Such
a hardcore function is a crucial element of the construction of a pseudorandom generator as well as a bit
commitment protocol from a one-way permutation. A typical example is the inner-product-mod-two function
GLx(r) of Goldreich and Levin [16], computing 〈x, r〉, the bitwise inner product modulo two, which constitutes
a hardcore bit for any (strong) one-way function.† Since GLx(r) equals the rth bit of the codeword HAD
(2)
x =
(〈x, 0n〉, 〈x, 0n−11〉, · · · , 〈x, 1n〉) of message x of a binary Hadamard code, Goldreich and Levin essentially gave
a polynomial-time list-decoding algorithm for this Hadamard code. Later, Goldreich, Rubinfeld, and Sudan
[17] discussed the hardcore property of q-ary Hadamard codes. In the recent literature, list-decoding has kept
playing a key role in a general construction of hardcores [2, 22].
Thirteen years later, the “quantum” hardcore property (i.e., a hardcore property against any feasible
“quantum” adversary) of GLx(·) was shown by Adcock and Cleve [1], who implicitly gave a simple and
efficient quantum algorithm that recovers x from the binary Hadamard code by exploiting the robust nature
of a quantum algorithm of Bernstein and Vazirani [7]. The simplicity of the proof of Adcock and Cleve can be
best compared to the original proof of Goldreich and Levin, who employed a rather complicated algorithm with
powerful techniques: self-correction property of the aforementioned Hadamard code and pairwise independent
∗An extended abstract appeared in the Proceedings of the 33rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and
Programming (ICALP 2006), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol.4052 (Part II), pp.216–227. Venice, Italy. July 10–14,
2006.
†Literally speaking, this statement is slightly misleading. To be more accurate, such a hard-core function concerns only the
one-way function of the form f ′(x, r) = (f(x), r) with |r| = poly(|x|) induced from an arbitrary strong one-way function f . See,
e.g., [15] for a detailed discussion.
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sampling. This highlights a significant role of robust quantum computation in the case of list-decoding (and
thus hardcores); however, it has been vastly unexplored until our work except for a quantum decoder of Barg
and Zhou [6] for simplex codes. No other quantum hardcore has been proven so far. The efficiency of robust
quantum algorithms with access to biased oracles has been also discussed in a different context [4, 9, 24].
As our main result, we present three new quantum hardcore functions: q-ary Hadamard codes HAD(q),
shifted Legendre symbol codes SLSp, and pairwise equality codes PEQ (see Section 2 for their definitions),
for any (strongly) quantum one-way function. The first hardcore function is a (nontrivial) extension of the
aforementioned result of Adcock and Cleve [1], and the latter two are not yet known to be classical hardcores
(see, e.g., [18]). With regard to SLSp, in particular, we can prove the quantum hardcore property of Damg˚ard’s
pseudorandom generator [11]. This gives a “quantum” solution to his question of whether his generator has
the classical hardcore property (this is also listed as an open problem in [18]).
Our argument proceeds by relating proving the quantum hardcore property of a given code C (seen as a
function) to solving the quantum list-decoding problem for C via direct access to a quantum-computationally
(or quantumly) corrupted codeword, which is given as a black-box oracle. A quantum list-decoding algorithm
(called a quantum list-decoder) tries to list all message candidates whose codewords match the quantumly-
corrupted codeword within a certain error rate bound. Let us first assume that the target function C is not any
quantum hardcore for a certain quantum one-way function f ′, of the form f ′(x, r) = (f(x), r), induced from
another quantum one-way function f . Next, we reduce proving the quantum hardcore property to constructing
a polynomial-time quantum list-decoder. Using this list-decoder, we further construct a polynomial-time
quantum algorithm that inverts f ′ with reasonable probability. This clearly contradicts the one-wayness of f ′
and hence proves the quantum hardcore property of C, as requested. Therefore, our major task of this paper
is to present fast quantum list-decoders for the aforementioned three codes.
Our proof technique exploits the quantum list-decodability of classical error-correcting codes (rather than
quantum error-correcting codes). For our purpose, we formulate the notion of complexity-theoretical quantum
list-decoding as a means of message recovery with quantum-computational errors rather than information-
theoretical errors, which are usually associated with classical transmission errors. This notion naturally ex-
pands the classical framework of list-decoding. Most significantly, our quantum list-decoders tend to be more
query-efficient than their classical counterparts; namely, the quantum list-decoders have lower query complex-
ity, which refers to the total number of queries to a given quantumly corrupted codeword. For instance, we
can build a quantum list-decoder for a q-ary Hadamard code HAD(q) that requires significantly fewer queries
than any well-known classical list-decoder for HAD(q).
Intuitively, a quantumly corrupted codeword expresses the behaviors of (possibly) faulty quantum encoders.
In classical list-decoding, a “classically” corrupted codeword is generated by a faulty channel as a result of
its transmission error. Particularly, it is useful to treat transmission error as a faulty encoding process of
messages to codewords when we seek applications of list-decoding in computational complexity. Another
key notion of this paper is a useful quantum state, called a (k-shuffled) codeword state, which uses quantum
“phase” to store the information on a given codeword. Similar states have appeared to play a key role in
several quantum algorithms in the recent literature [7, 13, 19, 29]. We then reduce constructing a quantum
list-decoder to constructing a quantum codeword-state decoder (i.e., a quantum algorithm that recovers a
message x from a codeword state which is given as an input). Quantum algorithms of van Dam, Hallgren,
and Ip [29] to “hidden shift” problems are actually an early example of quantum codeword-state decoders. In
our key lemmas, we show (i) how to generate such a codeword state from any (even adversarial) quantumly
corrupted codeword and (ii) how to convert a codeword-state decoder to a quantum list-decoding algorithm
working with a quantumly corrupted codeword. The robust construction made in the course of our proofs
also provides a useful means, known as “hardness” reduction, which is often crucial in the security proof of a
quantum cryptosystem. Using pretty good measurement [14, 21], we can present a generic way of proving the
quantum list-decodability of a code if the set of its corresponding codeword states forms a “nearly” orthogonal
basis. This construction method is general and constructive but not time-efficient. For particular circulant
codes, such as SLSp, however, we can give explicitly a quantum list-decoding algorithm.
Classical list-decodable codes have provided numerous applications in classical computational complexity
theory, including proving hardcores for any one-way function, hardness amplification, and derandomization
(see, e.g., [28]). Because our formulation of quantum list-decoding naturally extends classical one, many
classical list-decoding algorithms work in our quantum setting as well. This will make our quantum list-
decoding a powerful tool in quantum complexity theory and quantum computational cryptography.
2
2 New Quantum Hardcore Functions
We briefly give the formal definitions to the core concepts of this paper—quantum one-way functions and
quantum hardcore functions and then state our main contributions to the emerging field of quantum cryp-
tography. We assume the reader’s basic knowledge on quantum computation. Our underlying computation
model is quantum Turing machines [7, 30] and quantum circuits [31]. Informally, we use the term “quantum
algorithm” to describe a description of a certain unitary operator, possibly together with a specific projection
measurement at the end of a computation. For convenience, the notation A(x) for a quantum algorithm A
and an input x denotes a random variable representing the outcome of the execution of A on input x.
2.1 Quantum Hardcore Property
We begin with the notion of quantum one-way functions, which straightforwardly expands the classical one-
way functions introduced first by Diffie and Hellman [12] in 1976. Let N denote the set of all nonnegative
integers.
Definition 2.1 (quantum one-wayness) Let Σ be any alphabet. A function f from Σ∗ to Σ∗ is called
(strongly) quantum one-way if (i) there exists a polynomial-time deterministic algorithm G computing f and
(ii) for any polynomial-time quantum algorithm A, for any positive polynomial p, and for any sufficiently large
numbers n ∈ N,
Probx∈Σn,A [f(A(f(x), 1n)) = f(x)] < 1
p(n)
,
where x is uniformly distributed over Σn and the subscript A is a random variable determined by measuring
the final state of A in the computational basis. This paper considers only length-regular one-way functions,
where a function f mapping N to N is called length regular if, for every string x ∈ Σ∗, |f(x)| = ℓ(|x|) for a
certain length function ℓ(n).
Because of the deterministic feature of the above f , all quantum one-way functions are indeed classically
one-way. For any quantum one-way function f , the notation f ′ denotes the function induced from f by
the following randomization scheme: f ′(x, r) = (f(x), r) for all x, r ∈ Σ∗ with |r| = poly(|x|), where the
notation (y, r) means the concatenation of y and r following y. Notice that f ′ is also a quantum one-way
function. Throughout this paper, we deal only with quantum one-way functions of this form, which is in direct
connection to the following notion of quantum hardcore functions.
The notion of a classical hardcore was first discussed by Blum and Micali [8] in 1984. A hardcore measures
the hardness of predicting the value h(x) from f(x) without knowing x as an explicit input. We define a
hardcore function h mapping Σn to Σℓ(n) by the notion of indistinguishability between h(x) and a truly random
variable z over Σℓ(n) rather than the notion of nonapproximability. This is because indistinguishability and
nonapproximability define the same hardcore notion as long as the output size of hardcore functions is limited
to O(log n) (see, e.g., [15]).
Definition 2.2 (quantum hardcore) Let Σ be any alphabet and let f be any length-regular function from
Σ∗ to Σ∗. A polynomial-time computable function h with length function ℓ(n) is called a quantum hardcore
(function) of f if, for any polynomial-time quantum algorithm A, for any polynomial p, and for any sufficiently
large number n ∈ N, ∣∣∣∣Probx∈Σn,A[A(f(x), 1n) = h(x)]− 1|Σ|ℓ(n)
∣∣∣∣ < 1p(n) ,
where x is uniformly distributed over Σn and the subscript A is a random variable determined by measuring
the final state of A in the computational basis.
Since every classical randomized algorithm can be translated into a special form of a quantum algorithm,
every classical hardcore is also a quantum hardcore. We are mostly interested in the property that a function
h becomes a quantum hardcore of any quantum one-way function f ′ (of the form f ′(x, r) = (f(x), r) for an
appropriate quantum one-way function f). Succinctly, we refer to this property as the quantum hardcore
property of h.
As a main theme of this paper, we consider only functions expressed in the forms of block (error-correcting)
codes. Generally speaking, a block (error-correcting) code is a set of strings of the same length over a finite
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alphabet. Each string in a code is indexed by a message and is called a codeword. For our purpose, we are
focused on a family of codes, which is specified by a series {(Σn, In,Γn)}n∈N of message space Σn, index set In,
and code alphabet Γn associated with a length parameter n. For convenience, we write Σ
∗ for the set
⋃
n∈N Σn.
As standard now in computational complexity theory, we view the code C as a function that, for each
message length n (which serves as a basis parameter in this paper), maps Σn × In to Γn. We sometimes
write C(n) to denote the code C restricted to messages of length n. Notationally, we set N(n) = |Σn| and
q(n) = |Γn|. It is convenient to assume that Σn = (Γn)n so that n actually represents the length of a message
over Γn. By abbreviating C(x, r) as Cx(r), we also treat Cx(·) as a function mapping In to Γn. Denote by
M(n) the block length |In| of each codeword. We simply set In = {0, 1, . . . ,M(n)− 1}, each element of which
can be expressed in ⌈log2M(n)⌉ bits. We freely identify Cx with the vector (Cx(0), Cx(1), · · · , Cx(M(n)− 1))
in the ambient space (Γn)
M(n) of dimensionM(n). We often work on a finite field and it is convenient to regard
Γn as the finite field Fq(n) (= GF(q(n))) of order q(n), provided that q(n) is a prime power. The (Hamming)
distance d(Cx, Cy) between two codewords Cx and Cy is the number of non-zero components in the vector
Cx − Cy. In contrast, ∆(Cx, Cy) denotes the relative (Hamming) distance d(Cx, Cy)/M(n). Moreover, the
distance d(n) of a code C of message length n is the minimum distance between any pair of distinct codewords
of message length n in C.
The above-described code is simply called a (M(n), n)q(n)-code (or (M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code if d(n) is
emphasized). We may drop a length parameter n whenever we discuss a set of codewords for a “fixed” length
n; for instance, write Γ and M respectively for Γn and M(n).
Now, let us present three new quantum hardcore functions, two of which are unknown, at present, to be
classical hardcores. These new quantum hardcores are (i) q-ary Hadamard codes, (ii) shifted Legendre symbol
codes, and (iii) pairwise equality codes. We explain these quantum hardcores as codes and give polynomial-
time quantum list-decoding algorithms for them.
Theorem 2.3 Let p(n) and q(n) be any two functions mapping N to the prime numbers with q(n) ∈ nO(1)
and n = ⌈log p(n)⌉. The three functions HAD(q), SLSp, and PEQ, introduced below as classical block codes,
are all quantum hardcore functions for any quantum one-way function f ′ of the form f ′(x, r) = (f(x), r) for
any x and any r with |r| = s(|x|), where f is an arbitrary quantum one-way function and s is a polynomial.
1. The q(n)-ary Hadamard code HAD(q), whose codeword HAD(q)x is defined as HAD
(q)
x (r) =
∑2n−1
i=0 xi ·
ri mod q(n). The distance d(HAD
(q)) is (1− 1/q(n))q(n)n.
2. The pairwise equality code PEQ for even numbers n ∈ N, which is a (2n, n)2-code, whose codeword is
PEQx(r) =
⊕n/2
i=0 EQ(x2ix2i+1, r2ir2i+1), where EQ denotes the equality predicate (i.e., EQ(x, y) = 1 if
x = y and 0 otherwise) and ⊕ is the bitwise XOR.
3. The shifted Legendre symbol code SLSp, which is a (p(n), n)2-code with odd prime p(n), whose codeword
SLSpx is defined by the Legendre symbol
‡ as SLSpx(r) = 1 if
(
x+r
p(n)
)
= −1, and SLSpx(r) = 0 otherwise.
Earlier, Damg˚ard [11] introduced the so-called Legendre generator, which takes input (p(n), x) and produces
a q(n)-bit sequence whose rth bit equals SLSpx(r) for every index r ∈ Fp(n), where p is a fixed polynomial. He
asked whether his generator possesses the classical hardcore property (which is also listed as an open problem
in [18].) Theorem 2.3(3) proves the “quantum” hardcore property of Damg˚ard’s generator for any quantum
one-way function.
3 How can We Prove the Quantum Hardcore Property?
We shall outline our argument of proving the quantum hardcore property of a given function. To prove
new quantum hardcores, we exploit the notion of quantum list-decoding as a technical tool. Our approach
toward list-decoding is, however, complexity-theoretical in nature rather than information-theoretical. Our
main objects of quantum list-decoding are “classical” block codes and their codewords, which are manipulated
in a quantum fashion.
‡For any odd prime p, let
“
x
p
”
= 0 if p|x,
“
x
p
”
= 1 if p6 |x and x is a quadratic residue modulo p, and
“
x
p
”
= −1 otherwise.
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3.1 Quantum List Decoding
In classical list-decoding, we are allowed to access a received word, which is a “classically corrupted codeword,”
given as an oracle and our goal is to produce a short list of message candidates that match the received word.
Similar to the classical notion of a received word in coding theory, we introduce our terminology concerning
an oracle that represents a “quantum-computationally” (or “quantumly”) corrupted codeword that produces
garbage information of ℓ(n) size. For an immediate comparison to a quantum case, we use a more conceptual
term “classically corrupted codeword” instead of the conventional term “received word” in the rest of this
paper.
Let us formulate a notion of quantum list-decoding and present a key theorem, Theorem 3.3, which bridges
between quantum hardcore functions and quantum list-decoding.
Definition 3.1 (quantum-computationally corrupted codeword) We say that a unitary operator O˜
represents a quantum-computationally (or quantumly) corrupted codeword if there exists a function ℓ mapping
N to N such that, for any length parameter n ∈ N, any index r ∈ In, and any element u ∈ Γn, the operator O˜
satisfies
O˜|r〉|u〉|0ℓ(n)〉 =
∑
s∈Γn
αr,s|r〉|u ⊕ s〉|φr,s〉
for complex numbers αr,s with Σs∈Γn |αr,s|2 = 1 for each index r ∈ In, and for unit vectors |φr,s〉 in a
2ℓ(n)-dimensional Hilbert space, depending only on (r, s), where ⊕ is the bitwise XOR. Here, the parameter
ℓ(n) indicates the size of garbage information produced by O˜. Notice that O˜ is a unitary operator acting on a
Hilbert space spanned by the elements of
⋃
n∈N(In×Γn×{0, 1}ℓ(n)). For convenience, we identify a quantumly
corrupted codeword with its representing oracle and we simply call O˜ a quantumly corrupted codeword.
With the above notion, we shall describe a quantum version of a classical list-decoding problem. Let us
recall that our target function C(x, r) is always expressed as an (M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code family C = {Cx}x∈Σ∗ .
For the formulation of the quantum list-decoding problem, we introduce a notion of presence, which is a
quantum analogue of a “closeness”-scale between a codeword and its quantumly corrupted codeword. More
precisely, fix n ∈ N and x ∈ Σn and consider the entity (1/M(n))
∑
r∈In
|αr,Cx(r)|2 (using the terms given in
Definition 3.1). In comparison, let us review classical list decoding. For any given oracle O that represents
a classically corrupted codeword and for any error bound ε, a classical list decoder tries to output a short
list consisting of all messages x for which the probability, over r ∈ In, that O(r) equals Cx(r) is at least
1 − ε (namely, Probr∈In [O(r) = Cx(r)] ≥ 1 − ε). By setting pr,s = 1 if O˜(r) = s and 0 otherwise, the
behavior of O˜ can be viewed in a style of unitary operation as O˜|r〉|0〉 =∑r∈In pr,s|r〉|s〉. The aforementioned
entity (1/M(n))
∑
r∈In
|αr,Cx(r)|2 equals the probability Probr∈In [O˜(r) = Cx(r)] in a classical setting. For our
convenience, we name this entity the presence of Cx in O˜ and use the notation PreO˜(Cx) to describe it.
Our task of quantum list-decoding of the code C is, given a quantumly corrupted codeword O˜ for C and a
size parameter n (as well as garbage size ℓ(n) of O˜), to produce with success probability at least δ(n) a list of
candidates x, all of which satisfy the condition PreO˜(Cx) ≥ 1/q(n)+ε(n), where ε(n) is an error bias parameter
and δ(n) is a confidence parameter. For our application of quantum list-decoding to quantum hardcore, we
need to deal only with quantumly corrupted codewords O˜ of polynomial garbage size ℓ. A “quantum list
decoding algorithm” (or a “quantum list decoder”) means a procedure of carrying out this task with the two
parameters ε and δ.
Now, we formally define this notion as follows.
Definition 3.2 (quantum list decoder) Let C be any (M(n), n)q(n)-code family, let ε(n) be any error bias
parameter and let δ(n) be any confidence parameter. Moreover, let ℓ be any polynomially-bounded function
from N to N. A quantum list-decoding algorithm for C with respect to (ℓ, ε, δ) (or an (ℓ, ε, δ)-quantum list-
decoder) is a quantum algorithm (i.e., a unitary operator) D that solves with success probability at least δ(n)
the following quantum list-decoding problem:
Input: a message length n.
Implicit Input: an oracle O˜ representing a quantumly corrupted codeword of garbage size ℓ(n).
Output: a list of messages including all messages x ∈ Σn such that PreO˜(Cx) ≥ 1/q(n)+ ε(n); in other
words, codewords Cx have “slightly” higher presence in O˜ than the average. For convenience, we call
such a list a valid list.
5
IfD further runs in time polynomial in (n, 1/ε(n), log2[1/(1−δ(n))]) (if δ(n) = 1 then we treat 1/(1−δ(n)) as
1 for notational convenience), it is called a polynomial-time quantum list-decoding algorithm for C with respect
to (ℓ, ε, δ). We also say that C is (ℓ, ε, δ)-quantum list-decodable if C has an (ℓ, ε, δ)-quantum list-decoder.
Now, we are ready to give our key theorem, Theorem 3.3, which serves as a driving force to develop a theory
of quantum list decoding in the subsequent sections. Notably, Sections 4–6 will be devoted to the construction
of quantum list-decoders for each given quantum hardcore candidate. The first step is to establish a generic
technique of constructing quantum list-decoders for “well-behaved” classical block codes.
Theorem 3.3 Let C = {Cx}x∈Σ∗ be any (M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code with a message space Σ∗ =
⋃
n∈N Σn, which
is polynomial-time computable, where log2M(n) ∈ nO(1) and log2 q(n) ∈ nO(1). If, for any noticeable§ function
ε(n) and any polynomially-bounded function ℓ(n), there exist a noticeable function δ(n) and a polynomial-time
(ℓ, ε, δ)-quantum list-decoder for C, then C(x, r) is a quantum hardcore for any quantum one-way function
f ′ of the form f ′(x, r) = (f(x), r) with |x| = ⌈log2N(n)⌉ and |r| = ⌈log2M(n)⌉, where N(n) = |Σn|, and
therefore C satisfies the quantum hardcore property.
3.2 Quantumly Corrupted Codewords
Through this subsection to the next two subsections, we shall explain how to prove Theorem 3.3 with a succinct
justification of our notions of quantumly corrupted codeword, presence, and quantum list-decoding.
Now, let C = {(Σn, In,Γn)}n∈N be any (M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code family, where C is viewed as a collection
of functions mapping Σn × In to Γn for each length parameter n ∈ N. For simplicity, assume that p(n) =
⌈log2M(n)⌉ for a certain polynomial p. For every quantum one-way function f , we wish to prove that this
function C(x, r) is indeed a quantum hardcore for the induced quantum one-way function f ′ of the form
f ′(x, r) = (f(x), r) with |r| = p(|x|). For simplicity, we assume that all the elements in In, Σn, and Γn are
expressed in binary using an appropriate, simple, and easy encoding scheme. In the following argument, we fix
an arbitrary quantum one-eay function. To lead to a desired contradiction, we first assume to the contrary that
there exists a polynomial-time quantum algorithm A that approximates Cx(r) from input (f ′(x, r), 1n) with
success probability, over (x, r) ∈ Σn × In, at least 1/q(n) + ε(n) (where ε(n) is a certain noticeable function);
that is, ProbA,(x,r)[A(f ′(x, r), 1n) = Cx(r)] ≥ 1/q(n) + ε(n). Thus, there are at least an ε(n)/2-fraction of
|Σn| elements x ∈ Σn satisfying that A(f ′(x, r), 1n) outputs Cx(r) with probability at least 1/q(n) + ε(n)/2.
Meanwhile, we fix such an x and let y = f(x). The final configuration of the quantum algorithm A on input
((y, r), 1n), where r ∈ In, can be assumed to be of the form:
αy,r,Cx(r)|r〉|Cx(r)〉|φy,r,Cx(r)〉+
∑
s∈Γn−{Cx(r)}
αy,r,s|r〉|s〉|φy,r,s〉
for certain amplitudes αy,r,s and ancilla quantum states |φx,r,s〉 of ℓ(n) qubits, where the second register
corresponds to the output of the algorithm, where ℓ(n) is a polynomially-bounded function.
For the fixed string y, we pay our attention to the (restricted) algorithm Ay(·) =def A(y, ·). An implicit
input to our quantum list-decoder is a quantumly corrupted codeword O˜Ay , of garbage size ℓ(n), defined by
a certain unitary transformation that satisfies the following necessary condition:
O˜Ay |r〉|u〉|0ℓ(n)〉 =
∑
s∈Γn
αy,r,s|r〉|u ⊕ s〉|φy,r,s〉
for every pair (r, u) of strings. This oracle O˜Ay describes computational error (not transmission error) occurring
during the computation of Cx by the (possibly) faulty quantum algorithm A. This type of erroneous quantum
computation is similar to the computational errors (e.g., [1, 4, 5, 24]) dealt with in quantum computational
cryptography and quantum algorithm designing. Notice that the amplitudes {αy,r,s}r,s, in O˜Ay satisfy that∑
s∈Γn
|αy,r,s|2 = 1 for each index r ∈ In. Since O˜Ay is a unitary operation, its inverse O˜−1Ay can be uniquely
defined.
We can freely access O˜Ay (as well as O˜
−1
Ay
) by simply invoking a query, using three registers containing
(r, u). Upon an oracle call, the oracle is automatically applied to the three registers and all the contents of
these registers are modified at the cost of unit time.
§A function µ from N to R is said to be noticeable if there exists a positive polynomial p such that µ(n) ≥ 1/p(n) for any
sufficiently large number n ∈ N.
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3.3 Presence and List Size
To lead to our desired contradiction, we need to invert the function f(x) by extracting x from the aforemen-
tioned quantumly corrupted codeword O˜Ay in time polynomial in |x|.
Before proceeding our proof further, we make a close look at the presence notion. For our quantumly cor-
rupted codeword O˜Ay for a target codewordCx, its presence PreO˜Ay (Cx), which is (1/M(n))
∑
r∈In
|αy,r,Cx(r)|2,
coincides with the probability that the algorithm A successfully computes Cx(r) from (y, r). From our as-
sumption, it holds that PreO˜Ay (Cx) ≥ 1/q(n) + ε(n).
From a slightly different view point, we can argue that the presence notion is indeed an extension of relative
(Hamming) distance. This will be used in the proof of Lemma 3.4. Let v denote a classically corrupted
codeword. We can view v as a binary vector in the q(n)M(n)-dimensional space, in which the rth block v[r]
of v is of the form 0i−110q(n)−i for a certain index i ∈ [q(n)], where r ∈M(n). Using this new representation,
the relative (Hamming) distance between two classically corrupted codewords v and w equals the ℓ1-norm
‖v − w‖1 =
∑
r∈[M(n)] ‖v[r] − w[r]‖. Similarly, for a quantumly corrupted codeword vO˜Ay that the oracle
O˜Ay represents, vO˜Ay can be viewed as the real vector in the q(n)M(n)-dimensional space, in which vO˜Ay [r]
is (|αr,0|2, |αr,1|2, . . . , |αr,q(n)−1|2). The presence PreO˜Ay (Cx) now indicates the ℓ1-norm between vO˜Ay and
a codeword Cx, extending the classical notion of distance. We then obtain ‖vO˜Ay − Cx‖1 ≥ 1/q(n) + ε(n).
Therefore, if we can find all elements x′ satisfying PreO˜Ay (Cx
′) ≥ 1/q(n) + ε(n), at least one of them must
satisfy f(x′) = y.
Because no quantum list-decoder can output a valid list of super-polynomial size in polynomial time for the
quantumly corrupted codeword O˜Ay , there is an important question to answer: how many messages x satisfy
the required inequality PreO˜Ay (Cx) ≥ 1/q(n) + ε(n)? We want to show an upper bound of the number of
codewords that have relatively high presence in a given quantumly corrupted word. For our proof, we employ
a proof method of Guruswami and Sudan [20], who gave a q-ary extension of Johnson bound using a geometric
method.
Lemma 3.4 Let n be any message length. Let ε(n), q(n), d(n), and M(n) satisfy that ε(n) > k(n) =def
(1− 1/q(n))
√
1− d(n)/M(n) (1 + 1/(q(n)− 1)). For any (M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code C and for any given quan-
tumly corrupted codeword O˜, there are at most
Jε,q,d,M (n) =def min

M(n)(q(n) − 1),
d(n) (1− 1/q(n))
M(n)ε2(n) + (1− 1/q(n)) [d(n)−M(n) (1− 1/q(n))]
ff
messages x ∈ Σn such that PreO˜(Cx) ≥ 1/q(n) + ε(n). If ε(n) = k(n), then the above bound can be replaced
by 2M(n)(q(n)− 1)− 1.
The proof of Lemma 3.4 is in essence a simple modification of the proof in [20]; however, for completeness,
we include the proof of the lemma in Appendix. As a quick example, we present the value Jε,q,d,M (n) for a
(qn, n, qn − qn−1)q Hadamard code.
Example: Hadamard Codes. Consider an (M(n), n, d(n))q(n) Hadamard code HAD
(q) = {HAD(q)x }x∈Σ∗
withM(n) = q(n)n and d(n) = (1− 1/q(n))M(n). Assume that our bias parameter ε is non zero (i.e., ε(n) >
0 for all n ∈ N). Lemma 3.4 guarantees that, for any quantumly corrupted codeword O˜, the number of
codeword candidates that satisfy the inequality PreO˜(HAD
(q)
x ) ≥ 1/q(n) + ε(n) is at most
d(n)
(
1− 1q(n)
)
M(n)ε(n)2 +
(
1− 1q(n)
) [
d(n)−M(n)
(
1− 1q(n)
)] = (1− 1
q(n)
)2
· 1
ε(n)2
.
In particular, if there exists a positive polynomial p satisfying ε(n) ≥ 1/p(n) for all n ∈ N, there are only at
most (1− 1/q(n))2 p(n)2 codeword candidates.
3.4 Applying a Quantum List Decoder
Let us return to our proof of Theorem 3.3. By the premise of the theorem, there exist a noticeable function δ
and a polynomial-time (ℓ, ε, δ)-quantum list-decoding algorithmD for Cx(·) with certain noticeable probability,
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say δ(n).
For simplicity, we assume that, for each oracle access, our quantum list-decoder D uses its last three
registers |r〉|u〉|t〉, in which the last register holds a quantum state of polynomially-many qubits.
Since the garbage size ℓ(n) of O˜Ay is polynomially bounded, we can assume that, after an oracle call, the
oracle O˜Ay (or its inverse O˜
−1
Ay
) is automatically applied to the last three registers of D with a unit cost of
time. For convenience, the last register is assumed to hold only 0s at the beginning of the computation.
With oracle access to this oracle O˜Ay (as well as its inverse O˜
−1
Ay
), our quantum list-decoder D can produce
with probability at least δ(n) all possible candidates x′ that have the required presence PreO˜Ay (Cx
′) of at
least 1/q(n) + ε(n)/2. As seen before, at least one of these candidates lies in the pre-image f−1(y). Since we
can check whether f(x′) = y in polynomial time, it suffices for us to output one of such elements x′. This
implies that, for at least (ε(n)/2)|Σn| elements x, we can find x′ in polynomial time such that f(x′) = f(x).
Our quantum list-decoder D therefore gives rise to a polynomial-time quantum algorithm that inverts f on a
noticeable fraction of inputs x with noticeable probability. This clearly contradicts the quantum one-wayness
of f .
Therefore, the quantum hardcore property holds for C and this completes the proof of Theorem 3.3.
4 Key Roles of Quantum Codeword-State Decoders
How can we prove the quantum hardcore property of our target quantum hardcore candidates? As outlined in
Section 3, our goal is to construct a polynomial-time quantum list-decoder for each of the target candidates.
Theorem 3.3 gives a sufficient condition to prove the quantum hardcore property of any given code C. It is
therefore enough for us to design a quantum algorithm that solves the quantum list-decoding problem for C
with high probability in polynomial time. Our task in this paper is now fixed to find a generic way to construct
a polynomial-time quantum list-decoder for a wide range of classical block codes. Notice that it seems hard
to design classically such list-decoding algorithms. Let us introduce a central notion of k-shuffled codeword
states, which is a unique quantum state encoding all information on a given codeword.
4.1 Quantum Codeword States
Hereafter, we assume the basic arithmetic operations (multiplication, addition, subtraction, division, etc.)
on a finite field Fq of order q. When q is a prime number, Fq can be identified with the integer ring Z/qZ
whose elements are written as 0, 1, 2, . . . , q − 1. For convenience, let F+q stand for Fq − {0}. The notation
Zq denotes the (finite) additive group whose elements are 0, 1, 2, . . . , q − 1. Moreover, we write [m,n]Z =
{m,m+ 1,m+ 2, . . . , n} for any two integers m,n ∈ N with m ≤ n and, in particular, let [q] = [1, q]Z for any
integer q ≥ 1 in the rest of this paper. Finally, we denote by ωq the complex number e2πι/q, where e is the
base of natural logarithms and ι =
√−1.
Definition 4.1 (shuffled codeword state) Let C = {Cx}x∈Σ∗ be any (M(n), n)q(n)-code family with a
message space Σ∗ =
⋃
n∈N Σn and a series {In}n∈N of index sets. Let k be any element in F+q(n). A k-shuffled
codeword state for the codeword Cx that encodes a message x ∈ Σn is the quantum state
|C(k)x 〉 =
1√
M(n)
∑
r∈In
ω
k·Cx(r)
q(n) |r〉.
In particular, when k = 1, we use the simplified notation |Cx〉 for |C(1)x 〉.
A robust nature of quantum computation enables us to prove that, as long as we have a decoding algorithm
A from a shuffled codeword state, we can construct a quantum list-decoder by calling A as a black-box oracle.
The notion of such codeword states plays a central role as our technical tool in proving new quantum hardcores.
The reader may be aware that our notion of codeword states is not anew; the codeword states for certain
binary codes have already appeared implicitly in several important quantum algorithms. For instance, Grover’s
search algorithm [19] produces such a codeword state after the first oracle call. In the quantum algorithms of
Bernstein and Vazirani [7], of Deutch and Jozsa [13], and of van Dam, Hallgren, and Ip [29], such codeword
states are generated to obtain their results. All these quantum algorithms hinge at generating codeword states.
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Our task is to recover x with reasonable probability from each k-shuffled codeword state |C(k)x 〉. Any
quantum algorithm that completes this task is succinctly called a codeword-state decoder. We formally define
the quantum codeword-state decoders.
Definition 4.2 (quantum codeword-state decodability) Let η ∈ [0, 1]. A classical (M(n), n)q(n)-code
family is said to be η-quantum codeword-state decodable if there exists a quantum algorithm that, on input
n ∈ N and k ∈ F+q(n) as well as |C
(k)
x 〉, recovers x with success probability at least η. Such an algorithm is
simply called an η-quantum codeword-state decoder.
Let us prove the following key theorem, which helps us convert quantum codeword states into quantum
list-decoders. The following theorem, Theorem 4.3, which is general but slightly technical, shows how we can
convert a codeword-state decoder D for a given code C into a quantum list-decoder B for C that produces
a valid list of appropriate size. Under a certain condition, we can make this quantum list-decoder to run in
polynomial time.
Recall the definition of Jε,q,d,M (n) given in Lemma 3.4. Note that Jε,q,d,M (n) ≤ 2M(n)q(n). In the
following, “e” stands for the base of the natural logarithm.
Theorem 4.3 Let C = {Cx}x∈Σ∗ be any (M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code. Let ε and δ be any two nonnegative
functions with 0 ≤ ε(n) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ δ(n) < 1 for all numbers n ∈ N. Let ℓ be any polynomially-bounded
function from N to N. If there exists a (1 − ν(n))-quantum codeword-state decoder D for C with 1 − ν(n) >√
1− ηε(n)2 for a certain function ν(n) from N to [0, 1], then there exists an (ℓ, ε, δ)-quantum list-decoder B
for C with oracle access to O˜ such that B produces a list of size at most⌈
q(n)− 1
1− ν(n)−
√
1− ηε(n)2
(
loge Jε,q,d,M (n) + loge
1
1− δ(n)
)⌉
,
where ηε(n) = (q(n)/(q(n) − 1))ε(n) and the query complexity (i.e., the total number of queries to O˜ as well
as O˜−1) is at most twice as many as the list size. Moreover, letting σ(n) = 1− ν(n)−
√
1− ηε(n)2, if D runs
in time polynomial in (n, q(n), log2M(n)) and σ is a positive-valued function whose reciprocal (i.e., 1/σ(n))
is polynomially-bounded in (n, q(n), log2M(n), 1/ε(n), log2(1/(1 − δ(n)))) from above, then B runs in time
polynomial in (n, q(n), log2M(n), 1/ε(n), log2(1/(1− δ(n)))).
Combining Theorem 4.3 together with Theorem 3.3, we can establish a direct connection between the
existence of polynomial-time quantum codeword-state decoder for a code C and the quantum hardcore property
of C.
Corollary 4.4 Let s be any negligible function mapping N to the interval [0, 1]. Let C be any (M(n), n)q(n)-
code family with log2M(n) ∈ nO(1) and q(n) ∈ nO(1). Let δ(n) = 1 − 2−n for every number n ∈ N. If there
exists a polynomial-time (1 − s)-quantum codeword-state decoder for C, then, for any noticeable function ε
and any polynomially-bounded function ℓ, there exists a polynomial-time (ℓ, ε, δ)-quantum list-decoder for C.
Hence, C satisfies the quantum hardcore property.
Proof. Let s be any negligible function and let D be a polynomial-time (1 − s)-quantum codeword-
state decoder for an (M(n), n)q(n)-code family C. Define δ(n) = 1 − 2−n for any n ∈ N+. Note that
log2(1/(1 − δ(n))) = log2 2n = n. Let ε be any noticeable function. Let ηε(n) = (q(n)/(q(n) − 1))ε(n). By
the definition of noticeability, there is an appropriate positive polynomial p′ such that ε(n) ≥ 1/p′(n) for any
sufficiently large n ∈ N. To apply Theorem 4.3, we need to show that σ(n) = (1 − s(n)) −
√
1− ηε(n)2 is
a noticeable function (in n), because the functions log2M(n), q(n), 1/ε(n), and log2(1/(1 − δ(n))) are all
polynomially bounded in n. Fix any sufficiently large number n in N so that the following argument always
holds. Since s is a negligible function, it follows that s(n) ≤ 1/4p′(n)2. Using the inequality √1− x ≤ 1−x/2,
we obtain
σ(n) ≥ 1− s(n)−
√
1− ε(n)2 ≥ 1− 1
4p′(n)2
−
(
1− 1
2p′(n)2
)
=
1
4p′(n)2
.
Since n is arbitrary, σ is clearly a noticeable function, as requested. By Theorem 4.3, we then obtain an
(ℓ, ε, δ)-quantum list-decoder for C running in time polynomial in n. ✷
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4.2 Proof of Theorem 4.3
We shall prove our key theorem, Theorem 4.3. The lemma will be proven in two stages. In the first stage,
we present how to generate a quantum state |Cx〉 from each quantumly corrupted codeword O˜ for Cx. In the
second stage, we show how to list-decode x from |Cx〉, using a given codeword-state decoder for C. These
stages give a desired quantum list-decoder for C.
As the first step, we shall show how to generate the k-shuffled codeword state |C(k)x 〉 for each q-ary codeword
Cx with oracle accesses to a quantumly corrupted codeword O˜. It is rather straightforward to generate the
quantum state |Cx〉 from the oracle OCx that represents Cx without any corruption (behaving as the “standard”
oracle). Using O˜, however, it seems difficult to produce |Cx〉 with relatively high probability. In Lemma 4.5,
loosely speaking, for a certain constant k > 0, we can produce in polynomial time a quantum state of the form
|k〉|C(k)x 〉|τ〉 from an initial state of the form |k〉|0m〉|0〉|0ℓ〉 with relatively good probability (if the presence
PreO˜(Cx) is far away from 1/q(n)). Moreover, we claim that there exists a “generic” quantum algorithm that
generates |k〉|C(k)x 〉|τ〉 zfor any q-ary code C.
Lemma 4.5 Let C be any (M(n), n)q(n)-code family with a message space Σ
∗ =
⋃
n∈N Σn, where q(n) is a
prime number for every n ∈ N. Let m be any function from N to N. There exists a quantum algorithm A
that, for any message length n ∈ N, for any quantumly corrupted codeword O˜ with garbage size ℓ(n), for any
message x ∈ Σn, and for any k ∈ F+q(n), generates the quantum state
|ψk〉 = κ(k)x |k〉|C(k)x 〉|τ〉+ |Λ(k)x 〉
from the initial state |ψ(0)k 〉 = |k〉|0⌈log2 M(n)⌉〉|0〉|0ℓ(n)〉 with only two queries to O˜ and O˜−1, where |τ〉 is a
fixed basis vector, and κ
(k)
x is a complex number, and |Λ(k)x 〉 is a vector satisfying (〈k|〈C(k)x |〈τ |)|Λ(k)x 〉 = 0
with the following condition: for every x ∈ Σn, there exists an element k ∈ F+q(n) with the inequality |κ
(k)
x | ≥
(q(n)/(q(n)− 1)) |PreO˜(Cx)− 1/q(n)|. Moreover, A runs in time polynomial in (n, log2 q(n), log2M(n)).
Lemma 4.5 provides a generic way of generating a k-shuffled codeword state |C(k)x 〉 from O˜. When q = 2,
the bound of |κ(1)x | in Lemma 4.5 matches the bound of Adcock and Cleve [1].
Now, we give the proof of Lemma 4.5. Notice that the lemma is true for any q-ary code. The binary
case (q = 2) was discussed implicitly in [1]; however, our argument for the general q-ary case is more involved
because of our “k-shuffledness” condition.
Proof of Lemma 4.5. Since q(n) is a prime number, we use {0, 1, 2, . . . , q(n) − 1} as the elements of
Fq(n). We assume the premise of the theorem. Let C be any (M(n), n)q(n)-code family with message space
Σ∗ =
⋃
n∈NΣn, index sets {In}n∈N, and code alphabets {Γn}n∈N. Note that M(n) = |In|. Let O˜ be any
quantumly corrupted codeword of garbage size ℓ(n) for C, where ℓ is an arbitrary polynomially-bounded
function. First, we describe our quantum codeword-state generation algorithm A in detail. Fix n ∈ N,
x ∈ Σn, and k ∈ F+q(n) in the following description. For simplicity, we drop the script “n” and also let
m = ⌈log2M⌉.
Quantum Algorithm A:
(1) Start with the initial state |ψ(0)k 〉 = |k〉|0〉|0〉|0ℓ〉.
(2) Apply the quantum transform |0〉 → (1/
√
M)
∑
r∈In
|r〉 to the second register, and we obtain the super-
position
|ψ(1)k 〉 =
1√
M
∑
r∈In
|k〉|r〉|0〉|0ℓ〉.
(3) Invoke a query to the oracle O˜ using the last three registers. The resulting quantum state is
|ψ(2)k 〉 =
1√
M
∑
r∈In
∑
z∈Fq
αr,z|k〉|r〉|z〉|φr,z〉.
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(4) To obtain a k-shuffled codeword state, we need to transform |k〉|r〉 → ωk·rq |k〉|r〉. This transform can
be realized by the following series of simple transforms: |k〉|r〉|0〉 → |k〉|r〉|k · r mod q〉 → ωk·rq |k〉|r〉|k ·
r mod q〉 → ωk·rq |k〉|r〉|0〉. We then obtain the quantum state of the form
|ψ(3)k 〉 =
1√
M
∑
r∈In
∑
z∈Fq
ωk·zq αr,z|k〉|r〉|z〉|φr,z〉.
Since this step encodes the information on the first and the third resisters into the “phase”, for later
convenience, this step will be referred to as phase encoding.
(5) Apply the inverse oracle O˜−1 to the last three registers and denote the resulting state (I⊗ O˜−1)|ψ(3)k 〉 by
|ψ(4)k 〉. When the oracle is called, the last three registers are changed in a unit time. The final state |ψ(4)k 〉
can be expressed in the form κ
(k)
x |k〉|C(k)x 〉|τ〉 + |Λ(k)x 〉, where |τ〉 = |0〉|0ℓ〉 and (〈k|〈C(k)x |〈τ |)|Λ(k)x 〉 = 0.
The execution time of A is clearly upper-bounded by a certain polynomial in (n, log2 q, log2M). Now, we
want to calculate the amplitude κ
(k)
x . First, we note that
(I ⊗ O˜)|k〉|C(k)x 〉|τ〉 =
1√
M
∑
r∈In
∑
z∈Fq
ωk·Cx(r)q αr,z|k〉|r〉|z〉|φr,z〉.
We denote the above state by the quantum state by |ψ′〉. Therefore, we have
κ(k)x = (〈k|〈C(k)x |〈τ |)((I ⊗ O˜−1)|ψ(3)k 〉) = 〈ψ′k,x|ψ(3)k 〉
=
1
M
∑
r∈In
∑
z∈Fq
ωk(z−Cx(r))q |αr,z |2.
The non-trivial part of our proof is to show a lower-bound of |κ(k)x |. Notice that a different proof appeared
in [26]. By summing κ
(k)
x over all k ∈ F+q , the term
∑
k∈F+q
|κ(k)x | is lower-bounded by
∑
k∈F+q
∣∣∣κ(k)x ∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k∈F+q
1
M
∑
r∈In
∑
z∈Fq
ωk(z−Cx(r))q |αr,z |2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k∈F+q
∑
j∈Fq
ωk·jq
(
1
M
∑
r∈In
∣∣αr,Cx(r)+j∣∣2
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
We introduce a notation. For each value j ∈ Fq, write βj for the term (1/M)
∑
r∈In
|αr,Cx(r)+j|2. Note that
β0 = PreO˜(Cx) and 1− β0 =
∑
j∈F+q
βj . Using this βj-notation, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k∈F+q
∑
j∈Fq
ωk·jq βj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k∈F+q
ω0qβ0 +
∑
k∈F+q
ωkqβ1 + · · ·+
∑
k∈F+q
ω(q−1)kq βq−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣(q − 1)β0 −
∑
j∈F+q
βj
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= |(q − 1)PreO˜(Cx)− (1− PreO˜(Cx))|
= |q · PreO˜(Cx)− 1| .
Hence, we obtain (1/(q − 1))∑k∈F+q |κ(k)x | ≥ (1/(q − 1))|q · PreO˜(Cx) − 1|. This implies that there exists a
number k ∈ F+q for which
∣∣∣κ(k)x ∣∣∣ ≥ 1q − 1 |q · PreO˜(Cx)− 1| = qq − 1
∣∣∣∣PreO˜(Cx)− 1q
∣∣∣∣ .
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This completes the proof. ✷
Finally, we prove Theorem 4.3.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. We assume that there exists a (1 − ν)-quantum codeword-state decoder D for C
with 1− ν(n) >
√
1− ηε(n)2 for every number n ∈ N, where ηε(n) = (q(n)/(q(n)− 1))ε(n). Fix n ∈ N. Since
D is a (1 − ν)-quantum codeword-state decoder for C, for each x ∈ Σn and k ∈ F+q(n), D outputs x from
the k-shuffled codeword state |C(k)x 〉 with probability at least 1 − ν(n). Let O˜ be any quantumly corrupted
codeword for C. Given O˜ as an implicit input, we consider the following algorithm B that can solve the
quantum list-decoding problem for C with probability at least δ(n). Let A denote the quantum algorithm
given in Lemma 4.5.
For notational readability, we omit the script “n.” Write σ for the value 1 − ν −
√
1− η2ε . Initially, set
k = 1 in the algorithm B.
Quantum Algorithm B:
(1) Starting with |0m〉, run the algorithm A to obtain the quantum state |ψk〉.
(2) Apply the algorithm D to the second register of |ψk〉 using an appropriate number of ancilla qubits, say
m. We then obtain the state D|ψk〉|0m〉.
(3) Measure the obtained state and add this measured result to the list of message candidates.
(4) Repeat Steps (1)–(3) ⌈((1/σ)(loge Jε,q,d,M (n) + loge(1/(1− δ)))⌉ times.
(5) Repeat Steps (1)–(4) by incrementing k by one at each repetition until k = q − 1. Finally, output the
list that is produced.
For our convenience, we abbreviate as Bε the set {x ∈ Σn | PreO˜(Cx) ≥ 1/q+ ε}. Lemma 4.5 implies that,
for every element x ∈ Bε, there exists an index k ∈ F+q such that |κ(k)x | ≥ ηε. By letting X(k)Bε = {x ∈ Bε |
|κ(k)x | ≥ ηε}, we immediately obtain Bε =
⋃
k∈F+q
X
(k)
Bε
. We claim that the algorithm B satisfies the following
properties.
Claim 1 Let k ∈ F+q .
(1) Let x ∈ X(k)Bε . With probability at least σ, we can observe x when measuring the quantum state obtained
after Step (2) in the computational basis.
(2) If we proceed Steps (1)–(3) ⌈((1/σ)(loge |X(k)Bε | + loge(1/(1 − δ)))⌉ times for the same index k, then we
obtain a list that includes all messages in X
(k)
Bε
with probability at least δ.
Let us prove Claim 1. The trace distance ‖ρ− σ‖tr between two quantum states ρ and σ is defined to be
Tr
√
(ρ− σ)(ρ− σ)†. In particular, for two pure states |φ〉 and |ψ〉, the trace distance between them can be
calculated as ‖|φ〉〈φ| − |ψ〉〈ψ|‖tr = 2
√
1− |〈φ|ψ〉|2. For two (probability) distributions D1 and D2 over Σn,
the L1-norm (or the total variation distance) ‖D1 −D2‖1 is defined as
∑
x∈Σn
|D1(x) −D2(x)|.
Proof of Claim 1. We fix k ∈ F+q arbitrarily.
(1) Choose any element x ∈ X(k)Bε . Denote by pk(x) the probability of observing x at Step (3) during round
k. Our goal is to show that pk(x) ≥ σ. For simplicity, let |φx,k〉 = |k〉|C(k)x 〉|τ〉|0m〉 and |ψˆk〉 = |ψk〉|0m〉. The
trace distance between two pure states D|ψˆk〉 and D|φx,k〉 equals
‖D|φx,k〉〈φx,k|D† −D|ψˆk〉〈ψˆk|D†‖tr = ‖|φx,k〉〈φx,k| − |ψˆk〉〈ψˆk|‖tr = 2
√
1− |〈φx,k|ψˆk〉|2 = 2
√
1− |κ(k)x |2.
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Let D˜k(y) and Dx,k(y) be the probabilities of obtaining y ∈ Σn by measuring the states D|ψˆk〉 and
D|φx,k〉, respectively, in the computational basis. Note that pk(x) equals D˜k(x). Since the total variation
distance between D˜k and Dx,k is at most the trace distance between |k〉|C(k)x 〉|τ〉 and |ψk〉, it follows that
‖D˜k −Dx,k‖1 ≤ ‖D|φx,k〉〈φx,k|D† −D|ψˆk〉〈ψˆk|D†‖tr = 2
√
1− |κ(k)x |2.
Moreover, we claim that ‖D˜k − Dx,k‖1 ≥ 2(1 − ν − D˜k(x)). This is shown as follows. First, we note that
‖D˜k − D˜k,x‖1 is lower-bounded by
‖D˜k −Dx,k‖1 = |D˜k(x) −Dx,k(x)|+
∑
y:y 6=x
|D˜k(y)−Dx,k(y)|
≥ |D˜k(x) −Dx,k(x)|+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
y:y 6=x
D˜k(y)−
∑
y:y 6=x
Dx,k(y)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 2|D˜k(x)−Dx,k(x)|
since
∑
y∈Σn
D˜k(y) =
∑
y∈Σn
Dx,k(y) = 1. We then obtain
‖D˜k −Dx,k‖1 ≥ 2
∣∣∣D˜k(x)− D˜k,x(x)∣∣∣ ≥ 2(1− ν − D˜k(x)).
The above two bounds on ‖D˜k − D˜k,x‖1 yields the following inequality:
1− ν − D˜k(x) ≤
√
1− |κ(k)x |2,
which immediately implies
D˜k(x) ≥ 1− ν −
√
1− |κ(k)x |2 ≥ 1− ν −
√
1− η2ε = σ
since |κ(k)x | ≥ ηε. Therefore, we conclude that pk(x) ≥ σ, as requested.
(2) Assuming that Steps (1)–(3) for the same index k are repeated t times to create a list including all
the elements in X
(k)
Bε
, we wish to prove that t ≥ ((1/σ)(loge |X(k)Bε | + loge (1/(1− δ))). This gives the desired
bound since |X(k)Bε | ≤ Jε,q,d,M (n). Note that we obtain x ∈ X
(k)
Bε
through these steps with probability at least
σ. This implies that, for each fixed element x0 ∈ X(k)Bε , the probability of obtaining no x0 within t samples is
upper-bounded by (1 − σ)t. Therefore, with probability at most |X(k)Bε |(1 − σ)t, there exists an x ∈ X
(k)
Bε
for
which t samples does not contain x.
Since the probability of obtaining the desired valid list is at least δ, we demand the condition that |X(k)Bε |(1−
σ)t ≤ 1− δ; equivalently,
t loge
1
1− σ ≥ loge |X
(k)
Bε
|+ loge
1
1− δ ,
which yields the desired bound
t ≥ 1
σ
(
loge |X(k)Bε |+ loge
1
1− δ
)
because loge(1/(1− σ)) is lower-bounded by
loge
1
1− σ = − loge(1− σ) =
∞∑
i=1
σi
i
≥ σ.
This completes the proof of the claim. ✷
Claim 1 guarantees that, since |X(k)Bε | ≤ |Bε| ≤ Jε,q,d,M (n), for all indices k ∈ F+q , if we run Steps (1)-(4),
then we obtain a list containing all the elements in Bε with probability at least δ. Note that, at Step (3), we
add only one element into our list of candidates. Hence, the size of the list generated by B is at most q(n)− 1
times ⌈((1/σ)(loge |Bε|+ loge (1/(1− δ)))⌉. It is obvious that the total number of queries is at most twice as
many as the list size. ✷
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5 Nearly Phase-Orthogonal Codes
Through Sections 3–4, we have developed a solid foundation for the proof of our main theorem, presented in
Section 2, concerning the quantum hardcore property of three classical block codes. In this section, we shall
target two codes, q-ary Hadamard codes and pairwise equality codes, which share a common feature, called
nearly phase-orthogonality. The proof of their quantum hardcore property will exploit this feature.
5.1 Nearly Phase-Orthogonality
Now, we want to introduce a family of nearly phase-orthogonal codes. Let us first recall that, for any
(M(n), n)q(n)-code family with a message space Σ
∗ =
⋃
n∈N Σn and a series {In}n∈N of index sets, a k-
shuffled codeword state for a codeword Cx that encodes a message x ∈ Σn is the quantum state |C(k)x 〉 =
1√
M(n)
∑
r∈In
ω
k·Cx(r)
q(n) |r〉.
Definition 5.1 (nearly phase orthogonality) Let η be any function from N to the unit real interval [0, 1].
We say that a classical block (M(n), n)q(n)-code family C with a message space Σ =
⋃
n∈N Σn is said to be η-
nearly phase-orthogonal if |〈C(k)x |C(k)y 〉| ≤ η(n) for any number n ∈ N, any element k ∈ F+q(n), and any message
pair x, y ∈ Σn with x 6= y. In particular, any 0-nearly phase-orthogonal code is called phase orthogonal.
Notice that, since k-shuffled codeword states are pure quantum states, the value |〈C(k)x |C(k)y 〉| coincides
with the fidelity F (|C(k)x 〉, |C(k)y 〉) of |C(k)x 〉 and |C(k)y 〉.
The Hadamard code Had(q) is an example of phase-orthogonal code and its phase orthogonality plays
an important role in the proof of the quantum hardcore property of HAD(q) in Section 5.2. In general, the
phase-orthogonality of an (M(n), n)q(n)-code family C with a message space Σ
∗ =
⋃
n∈N Σn implies that, for
each pair (n, k) ∈ N × F+q(n), the set {|C
(k)
0 〉, |C(k)1 〉, . . . , |C(k)N(n)−1〉} forms an orthonormal basis of an N(n)-
dimensional Hilbert space, where N(n) = |Σn|. Note that, since a quantum hardcore C(x, r) requires the
condition that |r| = poly(|x|), it suffices to consider only (M(n), n)q(n)-codes C that satisfy the inequality
M(n) ≥ N(n). For any binary code, in particular, its phase-orthogonality can be naturally induced from the
standard inner product of two codewords when we translate their binary symbols {0, 1} into {+1,−1}.
An immediate benefit of the phase-orthogonality is explained as follows. If a code C = {Cx}x∈Σ∗ is phase-
orthogonal, then we can strengthen Lemma 4.5 so that we can isolate simultaneously all individual messages
x. Moreover, a nearly phase-orthogonal code C can provide a lower bound on the (Hamming) distance of C.
Proposition 5.2 Let C = {Cx}x∈Σ∗ be any (M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code. Let η be any function such that 0 ≤
η(n) ≤ 1 for any number n ∈ N. If C is η-nearly phase-orthogonal, the distance d(n) is lower-bounded by
(1− η(n))M(n)/2 for every length n.
Proposition 5.2 can be obtained from the following lemma, which relates the fidelity F (|C(k)x 〉, |C(k)y 〉) to
the relative Hamming distance ∆(Cx, Cy). The proof of the lemma is found in Appendix for readability.
Lemma 5.3 For any pair (Cx, Cy) of codewords in a given (M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code C and for any index
k ∈ F+q ,
F (|C(k)x 〉, |C(k)y 〉) ≥ 1− 2∆(Cx, Cy),
where the equality holds for any binary code C.
Let us explain how to prove Proposition 5.2 from Lemma 5.3. Let C be any (M(n), n, d(n))q(n)-code
that is η-nearly phase-orthogonal. From this nearly phase-orthogonality, the function η satisfies that η(n) ≥
|〈C(k)x |C(k)y 〉| for all parameters k, x, y with x 6= y. Apply Lemma 5.3 and we obtain η(n) ≥ 1−2d(Cx, Cy)/M(n),
from which we conclude that d(Cx, Cy) ≥ (1 − η(n))M(n)/2. Because d(n) is the distance, it follows that
d(n) ≥ d(Cx, Cy) ≥ (1− η(n))M(n)/2. This completes the proof of Proposition 5.2.
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5.2 Proof of Theorem 2.3(1-2)
How can we prove Theorem 2.3? As we have discussed in Sections 3–4, with help of Theorem 3.3 and Corollary
4.4, we can prove the quantum hardcore property of each function, given in Theorem 2.3, by constructing
its polynomial-time (1 − s)-quantum codeword-state decoder with a certain negligible function s. In this
subsection, we target two code families: q-ary Hadamard codes HAD(q) and pairwise equality codes PEQ. Our
quantum codeword-state decoders for these codes are obtained by exploiting their nearly phase-orthogonality.
For our proof, we assume the following limited form of quantum Fourier transform Fn, over a finite additive
group Zn, running in time polynomial in n: for any element s ∈ Zn,
Fn : |s〉 → 1√
n
∑
r∈Zn
ωs·rn |r〉.
For a more general form of quantum Fourier transform over a finite field Fn, see, e.g., [29], where the following
statement is proven: for any prime power q, Fq can be approximated to within error ε in time polynomial in
(log2 q, log2(1/ε)).
Proof of Theorem 2.3(1-2). It suffices to provide a negligible function s and a polynomial-time (1 − s)-
quantum codeword-state decoder for each of the given codewords C in Theorem 2.3(1-2). From such a decoder,
by Theorem 4.4, we can construct a polynomial-time quantum list-decoder for C. Theorem 3.3 then guarantees
the quantum hardcore property of C. In our case of HAD(q) and PEQ, we can utilize their phase-orthogonality
and build a polynomial-time (1− 2−n)-quantum codeword-state decoder for them.
Now, fix n ∈ N and omit “n” for readability.
(1) The simple case q = 2 was implicitly proven by Adcock and Cleve [1] and also by Bernstein and Vazirani
[7]. Consider the general case q ≥ 2. Obviously, HAD(q) is polynomial-time computable. Now, we intend
to show that HAD(q) is (1 − 2−n)-quantum codeword-state decodable. Let |HAD(q)〉 be a codeword state.
Consider the quantum Fourier transform Fq over Fq. To recover x from the codeword state |HAD(q)〉, we note
that
Fq|x〉 = 1√
q
∑
r∈Fq
ωx·rq |r〉 =
1√
q
∑
r∈Fq
ω
HAD(q)x (r)
q |r〉 = |HAD(q)x 〉.
Hence, apply the inverse of Fq to |HAD(q)x 〉 and we immediately obtain |x〉 with probability 1. Since q is
an arbitrary prime number, we may not simulate Fq exactly. Instead of applying Fq, however, we can use
its approximation whose approximation error is exponentially small. Therefore, we conclude that HAD(q) is
indeed (1− 2−n)-quantum codeword-state decodable, as requested.
(2) We want to prove that PEQ has a polynomial-time (1 − 2−n)-quantum codeword-state decoder. We
first observe the following key equation:
|PEQx(r)〉 =
1√
2n
∑
r=0
(−1)PEQx(r)|r〉
=
1√
4
∑
r1,r2
(−1)EQ(x1x2,r1r2)|r1r2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ 1√
4
∑
rn−1,rn
(−1)EQ(xn−1xn,rn−1rn)|rn−1rn〉.
Let us consider the following unitary transform HC , which we call the circulant Hadamard transform:
HC =def


−1 1 1 1
1 −1 1 1
1 1 −1 1
1 1 1 −1

 = F−14


−1 0 0 0
0 −1 0 0
0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 −1

F4,
where F4 is the quantum Fourier transform over F4. Since HC satisfies the equality
HC

 1√
4
∑
ri,ri+1
(−1)EQ(xixi+1,riri+1)|riri+1〉

 = |xixi+1〉,
15
we can obtain |φ〉 = |x1x2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |xn−1xn〉 from the codeword state |PEQx〉 by applying U = H⊗n/2C . Using
an approximation of F4, we can simulate the unitary operatorHC with exponentially small error. Finally, from
the quantum state |φ〉, we can easily deduce x. Therefore, we obtain a polynomial-time (1 − 2−n)-quantum
codeword-state decoder for PEQ. ✷
5.3 Query Complexity of Quantum List-Decoders
Whereas any known classical list-decoder for a q-ary Hadamard code needs a polynomial number of queries
per each message candidate, our quantum list-decoder constructed in the previous subsection requires only
two queries. For more general nearly phase-orthogonal codes, we shall show that these codes have quantum
list-decoders that make a significantly small number of queries to a given quantumly corrupted codeword.
Theorem 5.4 Let C = {(Σn, In,Γn)}n∈N be any (M(n), n)q(n)-code family and assume that q(n) ∈ nO(1)
and log2M(n) ∈ nO(1). Let η be any function from N to the unit real interval [0, 1] and assume that η(n)|Σn|
is a negligible function. If C is η-nearly phase-orthogonal, then there exists a quantum list-decoder for C whose
query complexity is propotional to the size of its output list.
The proof of Theorem 5.4 requires the following technical statement on nearly phase-orthogonal codes. We
show that certain types of nearly phase-orthogonal codes are indeed quantum list-decodable with low query
complexity.
Proposition 5.5 Let C be any (M(n), n)q(n)-code family with a message space Σ
∗ =
⋃
n∈N Σn. Let
N(n) = |Σn| for each length n. Let ε, δ, and η be any three functions from N to the real interval [0, 1],
and also let η′(n) = η(n)N(n) and ηε(n) = (q(n)/(q(n) − 1))ε(n) for every number n ∈ N. Let ℓ be any
polynomially-bounded function from N to N. Assume that η′ is a negligible function. Assume that there
is a positive-valued function σ for which its reciprocal is upper-bounded by a certain positive polynomial in
(n, q(n), log2M(n), 1/ε(n), log2(1/(1 − δ(n)))) and it also satisfies 1 − η′(n) − σ(n) >
√
1− ηε(n)2 for every
number n ∈ N. If C is η-nearly phase-orthogonal, then C is (ℓ, ε, δ)-quantum list-decodable with list size poly-
nomial in (n, q(n), log2M(n), 1/ε(n), log2(1/(1− δ(n)))) and query complexity is at most twice as many as the
list size.
We delay the proof of this proposition and quickly prove Theorem 5.4. With help of the proposition, the
proof of this theorem is similar to that of Theorem 3.3.
Proof of Theorem 5.4. Let C = {(Σn, In,Γn)}n∈N be any (M(n), n)q(n)-code family. Write N(n) = |Σn|.
For any number n ∈ N+, define δ(n) = 1− 2−n, which implies log2(1/(1− δ(n))) = n. Let ε be any noticeable
function from N to [0, 1]. Take a positive polynomial pˆ and assume that ε(n) ≥ 1/pˆ(n) for all numbers n ∈ N.
Let η be any function such that η′(n) = η(n)N(n) is negligible. Since η′ is negligible, it follows that, for all
sufficiently large numbers n, η′(n) is upper-bounded by 1/4pˆ(n)2.
Let us define σ as σ(n) = 1−η′(n)−
√
1− ηε(n)2, where ηε(n) = (q(n)/(q(n)−1))ε(n). Similar to the proof
of Corollary 4.4, the function 1/σ(n) is upper-bounded by 4pˆ(n)2. Since log2M(n) ∈ nO(1) and q(n) ∈ nO(1),
we can conclude that 1/σ(n) is bounded from above by a certain polynomial in (n, q(n), log2M(n), 1/ε(n), log2(1/(1−
δ(n)))) . Now, apply Proposition 5.5 and we obtain an (ℓ, ε, δ)-quantum list-decoder D for C with list size
polynomial in n. ✷
In the rest of this subsection, we shall give the proof of Proposition 5.5. This proposition follows directly
from Theorem 4.3 and the next key lemma, which states that any nearly phase-orthogonal code has a certain
type of quantum codeword-state decoder.
Lemma 5.6 Let C be any (M(n), n)q(n)-code family with a message space Σ
∗ =
⋃
n∈N Σn such that M(n) ≥
N(n) for all numbers n ∈ N, where N(n) = |Σn|. Let η be any function from N such that 0 ≤ η(n)N(n) ≤ 1
for any sufficiently large number n ∈ N. If C is η-nearly phase-orthogonal, then there exists a (1− η(n)N(n))-
quantum codeword-state decoder for C.
Lemma 5.6 helps us prove Proposition 5.5 in the following fashion. Assuming the premise of the
proposition, take η′(n) and take σ. Note that 1/σ(n) is upper-bounded by a certain polynomial in
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(n, q(n), log2M(n), 1/ε(n), log2(1/(1 − δ(n)))). For an given η-nearly phase-orthogonal code C, by Lemma
5.6, we obtain a (1 − η′(n))-quantum codeword-state decoder. Theorem 4.3 then guarantees the existence of
an (ℓ, ε, δ)-quantum list-decoder for C whose list size is polynomial in (n, q(n), log2M(n), 1/ε(n), log2(1/(1−
δ(n)))). This list-decoder has query complexity of at most twice as many as the list size. This completes the
proof of the proposition.
To prove Lemma 5.6, we use the notion of pretty-good measurement (known also as square-root measure-
ment or least-squares measurement) [14, 21]. Let En denote the n-by-n identity matrix. Before the proof, we
note the following lemma, which can be obtained by following the proof of [3, Lemma 9.1], in which the case
of real matrices is considered. Here, we treat every quantum state |φ〉 as a column vector.
Lemma 5.7 Let η ∈ [0, 1]. Let G = (ηi,j)i,j∈[N ] be any complex symmetric N -by-N matrix with ηi,i = 1 and
|ηi,j | ≤ ε for all pairs (i, j) ∈ [N ]2 with i 6= j. It then holds that
rank(G) ≥ N
1 + (N − 1)ε2 .
Proof of Lemma 5.6. Fix n ∈ N and k ∈ F+q(n). For simplicity, let IN = [0, N(n) − 1]Z. For readability,
we omit the script “n” in the rest of this proof. We wish to construct a quantum algorithm A whose success
probability of obtaining z from |C(k)z 〉 is at least 1 − ηN whenever |〈C(k)x |C(k)y 〉| ≤ η for any two distinct
messages x, y ∈ Σn.
We want to design A by following an argument of pretty good measurement [14, 21]. Let S be the M -by-N
matrix (|C(k)0 〉, |C(k)1 〉, . . . , |C(k)N−1〉), in which the ith column of S expresses the column vector |C(k)i 〉. Notice
that S|z〉N = |C(k)z 〉 for each z ∈ IN , where |z〉N denotes the N -dimensional unit vector whose zth entry is 1
and 0 elsewhere.
Note that S†S is an N -by-N matrix. We first show that rank(S†S) = N , which implies that all eigenvalues
of S†S are non-zero. Setting G = S†S and ε = η, Lemma 5.7 gives
rank(S†S) ≥ N
1 + (N − 1)η2 >
(
1− (N − 1)η2)N ≥ N − 1 + 1
N
.
We used the facts that 1/(1 + δ) > 1 − δ for any δ < 1 at the second inequality and η ≤ 1/N at the last
inequality. Since the rank is an integer larger than N − 1 + (1/N), it should be exactly N , concluding that
rank(S†S) = N .
Since S†S is Hermitian and positive definite, it has a set of positive eigenvalues, say {λ0, . . . , λN−1}. Let
λmin = min{λ0, λ1, . . . , λN−1} > 0. We claim that λmin is relatively large.
Claim 2 λmin ≥ 1− ηN .
Proof. Let G = S†S, the N -by-N matrix (ηi,j)i,j , where ηi,j = 〈C(k)i |C(k)j 〉. By our assumption, it follows
that |ηij | ≤ η for any pairs (i, j). Since G is Hermitian, let G =
∑N−1
i=0 λi|ψi〉〈ψi| be a spectral decomposition
of G for the eigenstates {|ψi〉}i∈IN . We then have
min
‖|ψ〉‖=1
|〈ψ|G|ψ〉| = min
‖|ψ〉‖=1
∣∣∣∣∣
N−1∑
i=0
λi|〈ψi|ψ〉|2
∣∣∣∣∣ = λmin.
Note that, for any state |ψ〉 of the form ∑i∈IN αi|i〉 with complex numbers αi’s, the value |〈ψ|G|ψ〉| equals
|〈ψ|G|ψ〉| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣1 +
∑
i6=j
ηi,jα
∗
iαj
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣1− η
∑
i<j
(|αi|2 + |αj |2) +
∑
i<j
η|αi|2 + ηi,jα∗iαj + ηj,iα∗jαi + η|αj |2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
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We then focus on the term
∑
i<j η|αi|2 + ηi,jα∗iαj + ηj,iα∗jαi + η|αj |2. We will show that the term is real
positive. Let γi,j = ηi,j/|ηi,j |. Since ηj,i = η∗i,j and η − |ηi,j | ≥ 0, we have∑
i<j
η|αi|2 + ηi,jα∗iαj + ηj,iα∗jαi + η|αj |2
=
∑
i<j
(η − |ηi,j |)|αi|2 + (η − |ηi,j |)|αj |2 + |ηi,j |(|αi|2 + γi,jα∗iαj + γ∗i,jα∗jαi + |αj |2)
=
∑
i<j
(η − |ηi,j |)|αi|2 + (η − |ηi,j |)|αj |2 + |ηi,j |(γ∗i,jαi + αj)(γi,jα∗i + α∗j )
=
∑
i<j
(η − |ηi,j |)|αi|2 + (η − |ηi,j |)|αj |2 + |ηi,j ||γ∗i,jαi + αj |2 ≥ 0.
Therefore, we have
min
‖|ψ〉‖=1
|〈ψ|G|ψ〉| ≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣1− η
∑
i<j
(|αi|2 + |αj |2)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 1− ηN.
✷
We continue our proof of Lemma 5.6. Let S = PTQ† be a singular-value decomposition (see, e.g., [23]),
where P is an M -by-M unitary matrix, Q is an N -by-N unitary matrix, and T is an M -by-N matrix of the
form
(
T ′
O
)
with the diagonal matrix T ′ = diag(
√
λ0,
√
λ1, . . . ,
√
λN−1). We therefore have 〈z|MUS|z〉N =
〈z|MUPTQ†|z〉N for any z ∈ IN .
We define an M -by-M matrix U as U = RP †, where the M -by-M matrix R is
R =
(
Q O
O EM−N
)
.
It immediately follows that, for any z ∈ IN ,
〈z|MUS|z〉N = 〈z|MRTQ†|z〉N = 〈z|M
(
Q O
O EM−N
)(
T ′
O
)
Q†|z〉N
= 〈z|M
(
QT ′Q†
O
)
|z〉N = 〈z|NQT ′Q†|z〉N .
The desired quantum algorithm A applies U and then measures its result. The above calculation indicates
that the probability of A’s recovering z from |Cz〉 is therefore lower-bounded by |〈z|NQT ′Q†|z〉N |2, which is
at least λmin. The above claim yields the desired conclusion. ✷
6 Circulant Codes
To design quantum codeword-state decoders, Proposition 5.5 gives a constructive but not time-efficint method
for nearly phase-orthogonal codes. Under a certain condition, we can construct quantum codeword-state
decoders that run in polynomial time. One of such conditions is “circulantness” of codes with a certain
property. A circulant code family C = {Ci}i∈N requires its associate matrices M (n)C = (Ci(j))i,j∈N to be
“circulant.” An example of such code families is the shifted Legendre symbol code SLSp described in Theorem
2.3. Earlier, van Dam, Hallgren, and Ip [29] discussed, in essence, the quantum codeword-state decoding of
SLSp in the context of hidden shift problems. With our notion of k-shuffled codeword states, we take a general
approach toward circulant codes and give a broader insight into their quantum list-decodability.
6.1 Circulantness and Fourier Transforms
We formally introduce the notion of circulant codes. First, we fix a positive integer n and let Ln = [0, n− 1]Z.
An n-by-n integer matrix Q = (qij)i,j∈[n] is called the cyclic permutation matrix if qn,1 = 1, qi,i+1 = 1 for any
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index i ∈ [n− 1], and the others are all zeros. Notice that Qn equals the identity matrix. A circulant matrix
M is of the form
∑
j∈Ln
ajQ
j for certain complex numbers {aj}j∈Ln ; in other words, the (i, j)-entry of M is
aj−i mod n for each pair i, j ∈ Ln.
Definition 6.1 (circulant code) A classical block code family C = {Ci}i∈N with index sets {In}n∈N is
said to be circulant¶ if, for every message length n ∈ N, the matrix M (n)C = (Ci(j))i,j∈In is circulant; namely,
M
(n)
C =
∑|In|−1
i=0 C0(i)Q
i, where Q denotes the M -by-M cyclic permutation matrix.
Circulant codes are desirable candidates for quantum hardcore functions. We shall give the proof of
Theorem 2.3(3) by exploiting the circulantness of SLSp.
The (discrete and quantum) Fourier transform is one of the most useful operations in use. Notice that
circulant matrices can be diagonalized by these Fourier transforms. Consider the quantum Fourier transform
Fn over Zn. Any circulant matrix M =
∑
j∈Ln
ajQ
j can be diagonalized by Fn as follows:
F−1n MFn = diag

∑
j∈Ln
ajω
i·j
n


i∈Ln
= diag

∑
j∈Ln
aj,
∑
j∈Ln
ajω
j
n,
∑
j∈Ln
ajω
2j
n . . . ,
∑
j∈Ln
ajω
(n−1)j
n

 .
From the definition of M
(n)
C in Definition 6.1, the transposed matrix (M
(n)
C )
t = (Cj(i))i,j∈In can be
expressed as
∑|In|−1
j=0 C0(|In| − j mod |In|)Qj and therefore it is also a circulant matrix.
Now, we focus our attention on k-shuffled codeword states of circulant codes. Let C be any (M(n), n)q(n)
circulant code with a series {In}n∈N of index sets. Consider k-shuffled codeword states |C(k)i 〉. Conven-
tionally, here we treat |C(k)i 〉 as the column vector [((1/
√
M)ω
k·Ci(j)
M )j∈In ]
t and 〈C(k)i | as the row vector
((1/
√
M)ω
−k·Ci(j)
M )j∈In . We use the notationMk,C to denote the matrix (|C(k)0 〉, . . . , |C(k)M(n)−1〉), which equals
Mk,C =
∑
j∈In
(
1√
M(n)
ωk·C0(M(n)−j modM(n))q
)
Qj
and the conjugate transpose of Mk,C can be expressed as
M †k,C =
∑
j∈In
(
1√
M(n)
ωk·C0(j)q
)
Qj.
Clearly, these matrices are circulant since so are the matrices (Ci(j))i,j∈In and (Cj(i))i,j∈In . Therefore, as
noted before, Mk,C can be diagonalized by the quantum Fourier transform FM as follows:
F−1M Mk,CFM = diag

 1√
M
∑
j∈In
ω−ijM ω
k·C0(j)
q


i∈In
.
Similarly, we obtain the following diagonalization:
F−1M M
†
k,CFM = diag

 1√
M
∑
j∈In
ωijMω
−k·C0(j)
q


i∈In
.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 2.3(3)
We shall give the proof of Theorem 2.3(3). Our proof relies on the next lemma, in which we prove that, if we
can approximate efficiently the matrix FMMk,CF
−1
M (described in the previous subsection), we can construct
efficiently a codeword-state decoder for C. The lemma requires the notion of operator norm ‖A‖ of a complex
square matrix A, defined as ‖A‖ = sup|φ〉,|ψ〉:‖|φ〉‖=‖|ψ〉‖=1 |〈φ|A|ψ〉|.
¶This notion is different from the codes that have circulant constructions (see, e.g., [25]).
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Lemma 6.2 Let C be an (M(n), n)q(n) circulant code. Let k ∈ F+q(n), δ ∈ [0, 1], and let Dk denote
FM(n)M
†
k,CF
−1
M(n). For each constant k ∈ F+q(n), let D˜k denote a linear operator such that ||D˜k − Dk|| ≤ δ,
where || · || denotes the operator norm. If D˜k is computable in time polynomial in (n, q(n), log2M(n)), then C
is (1− δ)2-quantum codeword-state decodable in time polynomial in (n, q(n), log2M(n)).
Proof. Let k ∈ F+q(n). By omitting the script “n,” our desired codeword-state decoder Uk that outputs i
from |C(k)i 〉 can be expressed in the form F−1M D˜kFM . Obviously, Uk is a linear operator that can be realized
in time polynomial in (n, q, logM).
Now, we wish to evaluate the success probability |〈i|Uk|C(k)i 〉|2 of obtaining i by applying Uk to |C(k)i 〉.
For convenience, let ∆k = D˜k −Dk. This ∆k satisfies the following inequality:
|〈i|F−1M ∆kFM |C(k)i 〉| = |(〈i|F−1M )∆k(FM |C(k)i 〉)| ≤ ‖∆k‖ = ‖D˜k −Dk‖ ≤ δ.
We then have
|〈i|Uk|C(k)i 〉| =
∣∣∣〈i|F−1M D˜kFM |C(k)i 〉|∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣〈i|F−1M (Dk +∆k)FM |C(k)i 〉∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣〈i|F−1M DkFM |C(k)i 〉∣∣∣− ∣∣∣〈i|F−1M ∆kFM |C(k)i 〉∣∣∣ ,
which is further bounded by
|〈i|Uk|C(k)i 〉| ≥
∣∣∣〈i|M †k,C |C(k)i 〉∣∣∣− ||∆k|| ≥ ∣∣∣〈i|M †k,C |C(k)i 〉∣∣∣− δ
=
∣∣∣〈C(k)i |C(k)i 〉∣∣∣ − δ = 1− δ.
Thus, we can obtain i from |C(k)i 〉 with probability at least (1 − δ)2. Since D˜k can be computed in time
polynomial in (n, q, logM), our codeword-state decode also runs in time polynomial in (n, q, logM). ✷
With help of Lemma 6.2 together with Theorems 3.3 and 4.4, we prove Theorem 2.3(3).
Proof of Theorem 2.3(3). We wish to give a polynomial-time (1− s)-quantum codeword-state decoder for
SLSp, where s is a certain negligible function. Theorems 3.3 and 4.4 then guarantee the quantum hardcore
property of SLSp.
Let fix n ∈ N and consider a new code C defined as follows: let Ci(j) be SLSp−i(j) (using “−i” instead
of “i”) for each pair i, j ∈ In. Since C is a circulant code, we hereafter consider its associated matrix
M †2,C =
∑
j∈Fp
(
(1/
√
p)ω
C0(j)
2
)
Qj.
To obtain a quantum codeword-state decoder for Ci, we use Lemma 6.2. First, we define a useful constant
cp as follows: cp = 1 if p ≡ 1 mod 4, and cp = ι (i.e., the unit of imaginary numbers) if p ≡ 3 mod 4. This
constant cp satisfies the following equation (see e.g. [10]):
(∗) 1√
p
∑
j∈Fp
(
j
p
)
ωa·jp = cp
(
a
p
)
for any number a ∈ [0, p− 1]Z. Let D2 = F−1p M †2,CFp, which equals
D2 = diag

 1√
p
∑
j∈Fp
ωijp ω
−C0(j)
2


i∈In
= diag

 1√
p
+
1√
p
∑
j∈Fp
(
j
p
)
ωijp


i∈In
because ω
−C0(0)
2 = 1 and ω
−C0(j)
2 =
(
j
p
)
for any number j ∈ F+p . By (*), we have
D2 = diag
(
1√
p
+ cp
(
i
p
))
i∈In
= diag
(
1√
p
,
1√
p
+ cpω
−C0(1)
2 , . . . ,
1√
p
+ cpω
−C0(p−1)
2
)
.
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We define our desired linear operator D˜2 as D˜2 = diag
(
0, cpω
−C0(1)
2 , . . . , cpω
−C0(p−1)
2
)
. This definition
makes the operator norm ‖D2 − D˜2‖ equal
‖D2 − D˜2‖ =
∥∥∥∥diag
(
1√
p
, . . . ,
1√
p
)∥∥∥∥ = 1√p .
How can we realize this D˜2? The operator D˜2 can be realized by the following polynomial-time algorithm.
On input |i〉|0〉, where i ∈ Fq, compute cp|i〉|C0(i)〉 in a reversible fashion. Apply the phase-shift
transform that changes |i〉|a〉 to ω−a2 |i〉|a〉. Uncompute |C0(i)〉 in the last register and we obtain
cpω
−C0(i)
2 |i〉|0〉. Finally, when i = 0, we reject the input.
Therefore, Lemma 6.2 gives a (1−1/√p)2-quantum codeword-state decoder for C that runs in time polynomial
in n. Since (1 − 1/√p)2 ≥ 1− 2/√p, it suffices to define s(n) = 2/√p.
To list-decode SLS, since SLSpi (j) = C−i(j), we first find −i from the codeword C−i(·) and then output i.
This procedure gives rise to a quantum list-decoder for SLSp. ✷
Acknowledgments: The first author is grateful to Harumichi Nishimura for his pointing out an early error.
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Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 5.3
We give the proof of Lemma 5.3. Fix n arbitrarily and drop the subscript “n” for simplicity. For each index
ℓ ∈ [0, q − 1]Z, we define d(k)ℓ (Cx, Cy) = |{r ∈ In | k(Cx(r) − Cy(r)) = ℓ mod q}|. Since F (|C(k)x 〉, |C(k)y 〉) =
|〈C(k)x |C(k)y 〉|, it follows that
F (|C(k)x 〉, |C(k)y 〉) =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1M · ω0q · d(k)0 (Cx, Cy) + 1M
q−1∑
ℓ=1
ωℓq · d(k)ℓ (Cx, Cy)
∣∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣1− d(Cx, Cy)M
∣∣∣∣− 1M
q−1∑
ℓ=1
∣∣∣ωℓq · d(k)ℓ (Cx, Cy)∣∣∣
= (1−∆(Cx, Cy))−∆(Cx, Cy) = 1− 2∆(Cx, Cy),
which gives the desired bound of the lemma. In particular, when q = 2, since d
(k)
1 (Cx, Cy) = d(Cx, Cy) and
ω2 = −1, we obtain the equality F (|C(k)x 〉, |C(k)y 〉) = 1− 2∆(Cx, Cy).
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Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 3.4
For the proof of Lemma 3.4, we need to elaborate the brief description given in Section 3 on an interpretation
of presence.
For readability, we fix n and omit this n (for example, we write “q” instead of “q(n)”) in the following
proof. Let M = |In|. Let v be any quantumly corrupted word that O˜ represents. We view this v as the real
vector (v[0], v[1], . . . , v[M − 1]) in the Mq dimensional real space defined as follows: let v[r], the rth block of
v, be (|αr,0|2, |αr,1|2, . . . , |αr,q−1|2) if O˜|r〉|0〉|0ℓ(n)〉 =
∑
z∈Zq
αr,z |r〉|z〉|φr,z〉. Let {C1, C2, . . . , Cm} be the set
of all codewords that lie “close” to the given quantumly corrupted word. For each Ci, we define ci to be the
corresponding vector defined as follows: let ci[r], the rth block of ci, consist of zeros and one 1 at the zth
component if Ci(r) = z.
Let i ∈ [m] be any index. We further introduce a new parameter β ∈ [0, 1] and define w = β · v + 1−βq ·~1,
where ~1 is the vector of all 1s. Note that 〈~1|~1〉 =Mq. Note also that the (Hamming) distance d(Ci, Cj) between
codewords Ci and Cj is lower-bounded by d. Moreover, we have 〈ci|v〉 =
∑
r |αr,Ci(r)|2 =M ·PreO˜(Ci), where〈v|w〉 denotes the standard inner product of two vectors v and w. Note that 〈ci|ci〉 =M .
For each i ∈ [m], let cˆi = ci − w. We consider the set {cˆi}i∈[m]. We define the space K = {x ∈ RM × Rq |
∀r ∈ In[
∑
z∈Zq
xr,z = 0]}. Notice that {cˆi}i∈[m] ⊆ K and dim(K) = M(q − 1). Moreover, let wˆ be the
projection of w onto K.
Let us first describe the following result stated in [20].
Lemma B.1 [20] Let {ui}i∈[m] ⊆ RK be m non-zero vectors such that 〈ui|uj〉 ≤ 0 for any distinct pair
i, j ∈ [m]. Let γ > 0.
1. If ∃v ∈ RK∀i ∈ [m][〈v|ui〉 > 0], then m ≤ K.
2. If ∀i ∈ [m][‖ui‖ = 1] and ∀i, j ∈ [m][i 6= j → 〈ui|uj〉 ≤ −γ], then m ≤ 1 + 1/γ.
3. If ∃v ∈ RK∀i ∈ [m][〈v|ui〉 ≥ 0], then m ≤ 2K − 1.
The First Upper Bound. Let (i, j) be any distinct pair taken from [m]. The values 〈ci|w〉, 〈w|w〉, and
〈ci|cj〉 can be bounded as follows:
〈ci|w〉 = β〈ci|v〉+ 1− β
q
〈ci|~1〉 = βMPreO˜(Ci) +
1− β
q
M ≥ βM
(
1
q
+ ε
)
+
M(1− β)
q
.
〈w|w〉 = β2〈v|v〉 + 2β(1− β)
q
〈v|~1〉+ (1 − β)
2
q2
〈~1|~1〉 ≤Mβ2 + 2Mβ(1− β)
q
+
M(1− β)2
q
.
〈ci|cj〉 =M − d(Ci, Cj) ≤M − d.
Let us consider the set {cˆi | i ∈ [m]}. Now, the inner product 〈cˆi|cˆj〉 for a distinct pair i, j ∈ [m] is estimated
as
〈cˆi|cˆj〉 = 〈ci|cj〉+ 〈w|w〉 − 〈ci|w〉 − 〈cj |w〉
≤ M − d+Mβ2 + 2Nβ(1− β)
q
+
M(1− β)2
q
− 2M
[(
1
q
+ ε
)
β +
1− β
q
]
= M
(
1− 1
q
)[
β2 − 2qε
q − 1β + 1
]
− d.
For our convenience, we write d =
(
1− 1q
)
(1− δ)M using an appropriate value δ ∈ [0, 1]. It thus follows that:
〈cˆi|cˆj〉 ≤ M
(
1− 1
q
)[
β2 − 2qε
q − 1β + 1
]
−
(
1− 1
q
)
(1− δ)M
= M
(
1− 1
q
)[
β2 − 2qε
q − 1β + δ
]
.
To apply Lemma 1(1), we want to make 〈cˆi|cˆj〉 < 0. To do so, we require that β2 − 2qεq−1β + δ < 0, which
is equivalent to ε > 12
(
1− 1q
)(
β + δβ
)
. To minimize the value β + δβ , it suffices to take β =
√
δ. By
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replacing β by
√
δ, we obtain ε >
√
δ
(
1− 1q
)
. Since δ = 1 − dM
(
1 + 1q−1
)
, we obtain the bound ε >(
1− 1q
)√
1− dM
(
1 + 1q−1
)
.
Since cˆi, wˆ ∈ K, we have 〈cˆi|wˆ〉 = 〈cˆi|w〉. It thus follows that
〈cˆi|wˆ〉 = 〈ci − w|w〉 = 〈ci|w〉 − 〈w|w〉 ≥ Mβ
q
[qε− β(q − 1)] .
Since β =
√
δ, we have
〈cˆi|wˆ〉 > N
√
δ
q
[
q
√
δ
(
1− 1
q
)
−
√
δ(q − 1)
]
= 0.
This implies, by Lemma 1(1), that m ≤ dim(K) =M(q − 1).
The Second Upper Bound. We show the second upper bound. Recall that 〈cˆi|cˆj〉 ≤
M
(
1− 1q
) [
β2 − 2qεq−1β + δ
]
. We choose β = qεq−1 so that β
2 − 2qεq−1β = −β2. If δ < β2 =
(
qε
q−1
)2
, then
clearly, we have 〈cˆi|cˆj〉 ≤ M
(
1− 1q
) (
δ − β2) < 0. Note that the condition δ < ( qεq−1)2 is equivalent to
ε >
√
δ
(
1− 1q
)
. Since δ = 1 − dM
(
1 + 1q−1
)
= 1 − qdM(q−1) , we obtain that ε >
(
1− 1q
)√
1− dM
(
1 + 1q−1
)
as before. Since
∑n
i=1 a
2
i ≥ (1/n) (
∑n
i=1 ai)
2
for any real-valued series {ai}i∈[n], we obtain that 〈v|v〉 =∑
r
∑
i |αr,i|4 ≥M/q. Thus, 〈w|w〉 is lower-bounded by
〈w|w〉 ≥ Mβ
2
q
+
2M(1− β)
q
+
M(1− β)2
q
=
M
q
Since PreO˜(Ci) ≤ 1, we obtain 〈ci|w〉 ≤ βM +M(1− β)/q. We also have
‖cˆi‖2 = 〈ci|ci〉+ 〈w|w〉 − 2〈ci|w〉 ≥M + M
q
− 2
[
βM +
M(1− β)
q
]
=M
(
1− 1
q
)
(1− β)
By normalizing cˆi, we write ui =
cˆi
‖cˆi‖
. Hence, we have
〈ui|uj〉 = 〈cˆi|cˆj〉‖cˆi‖ · ‖cˆj‖ ≤
M(1− 1/q)(δ − β2)
M(1− 1/q)(1− β) = −
β2 − δ
1− β .
By Lemma 1(2), since 1− 1/q − ε ≥ 0, we conclude that
m ≤ 1 + 1− β
β2 − δ =
β2 − β − δ + 1
β2 − δ ≤
d
(
1− 1q
)
Mε2 +
(
1− 1q
) [
d−M
(
1− 1q
)] .
The Equality Case. Assume that ε =
(
1− 1q
)√
1− dM
(
1 + 1q−1
)
, which is equivalent to ε =
√
δ
(
1− 1q
)
. We want to show that m ≤ 2M(q − 1) − 1 by applying Lemma 1(3). Recall that 〈cˆi|cˆj〉 ≤
M
(
1− 1q
) [
β2 − 2qεq−1β + δ
]
. Taking β = qεq−1 (=
√
δ), we immediately obtain 〈cˆi|cˆj〉 ≤ 0. Let us consider
wˆ ∈ K. Since 〈cˆi|wˆ〉 = 〈cˆi|w〉, it follows that
〈cˆi|wˆ〉 = 〈ci|w〉 − 〈w|w〉
≥ βM
(
1
q
+ ε
)
+
M(1− β)
q
−Nβ2 − 2Mβ(1− β)
q
− M(1− β)
2
q
=
M
q
[
β(1 + qε) + (1− β)− qβ2 − β(1 − β)− (1− β)2] .
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Replacing β and ε by the appropriate terms using δ, we have
〈cˆi|wˆ〉 ≥ M
q
[(
1 + q ·
√
δ(q − 1)
q
)√
δ − qδ
]
=
M
q
[√
δ − δ
]
≥ 0
because 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Hence, by Lemma 1(3), we obtain that m = 2M(q − 1)− 1.
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